Haldir audit-prep evidence

demo_ef62b4fc828b · tier free · period 2025-05-17T11:50:24+00:00 → 2026-05-17T15:54:56+00:00 · generated 2026-05-17T15:54:56+00:00

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Haldir audit-prep

Gaps to close

✓ 1 passing · ! 5 warnings · ✗ 1 failing

Not a SOC2 attestation — measures how well your Haldir deployment aligns with signals relevant to a SOC2 audit. A full audit requires evidence across your entire organization, not just what Haldir sees.

CC6.1At least one API key uses restricted scopesWARN

All active keys hold wildcard scope ['*'].

Mint scope-restricted keys for non-admin uses: `haldir keys create --scopes audit:read,sessions:read`.

CC6.7Persistent encryption key configuredPASS

HALDIR_ENCRYPTION_KEY is configured. Cipher: AES-256-GCM.

CC7.2Audit chain verifies with recent entriesFAIL

Audit log is empty.

Log the first action: `haldir audit log <session-id> --tool <name> --action <verb>`.

CC7.2RFC 6962 Signed Tree Head over the audit logWARN

Audit log is empty — tree-head signs the empty tree.

Log any action; the Merkle tree populates automatically.

CC7.3Webhook alerting operational (>=95% 24h)WARN

No webhook endpoints registered.

CC5.2At least one session runs with a spend capWARN

No sessions exist yet.

Mint a session with `haldir session create --agent <id> --spend-limit 5.00`.

CC8.1Human-in-the-loop approvals configuredWARN

No approval rules configured and no decisions recorded.

7d 30d 90d YTD 365d

1 · Identity

Subscription tier free (n/a)
Period under audit 365.2 days

2 · Access control relevant to SOC2 CC6.1

API key inventory + per-key scope list. Contributes to CC6.1; full criterion also requires documented access policy, provisioning/de-provisioning procedures, periodic access reviews, and SSO/MFA enforcement.

API keys on file 1
Least-privilege keys present False

prefix	name	tier	scopes	last used	revoked
`hld_sew4YTR2`	compliance-demo	free	`*`	never	no

3 · Encryption relevant to SOC2 CC6.7

Vault uses AES-256-GCM with AAD binding to (tenant_id, secret_name); ciphertext is non-portable across tenants. Contributes to CC6.7; full criterion also requires documented encryption standards, key-management procedures, and TLS-in-transit evidence.

Cipher AES-256-GCM
Key size 256 bits
Nonce per encryption 96 bits
Auth tag 128 bits
AAD binding tenant_id || secret_name
Encryption key configured True
Cross-tenant ciphertext portable False

4 · Audit trail relevant to SOC2 CC7.2

SHA-256 hash chain over every recorded agent action. Contributes to CC7.2 by producing tamper-evident logs an auditor can spot-check. Full criterion also requires documented anomaly detection and incident-response procedures.

Entries recorded in period 0
Flagged in period 0
First entry —
Last entry —
Chain algorithm SHA-256 over canonical entry payload + prev_hash
Current chain head —
Chain integrity at issuance verified
Merkle tree algorithm RFC6962-SHA256
Signed tree size 0 leaves
Root hash e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8...
Inclusion proof endpoint /v1/audit/inclusion-proof/<entry_id>
Consistency proof endpoint /v1/audit/consistency-proof?first=N&second=M

5 · Spend governance relevant to SOC2 CC5.2

Per-session spend caps + payment-authorization records with remaining-budget snapshots. Contributes to CC5.2 by proving risk limits are enforced at the platform layer.

Total spend in period $0.00
Sessions with spend caps 0 of 0 (0.0%)
Payment authorizations 0 totaling $0.00

6 · Human approvals relevant to SOC2 CC8.1

Approval-request lifecycle (created → approved/denied with note) for agent actions. Contributes to CC8.1 as evidence of human-in-the-loop controls; full criterion covers software change management more broadly (code review, test coverage, deploy approvals).

Requests in period 0
Approved 0
Denied 0
Pending 0
Expired 0

7 · Outbound alerting relevant to SOC2 CC7.3

Outbound webhook deliveries (per-attempt status, retries, backoff) proving the alerting channels Haldir fires are operational. Contributes to CC7.3; full criterion also requires documented incident-response procedures.

Registered endpoints 0
Deliveries in period 0
Successful deliveries 0 (100.00%)
Signed payloads True (HMAC-SHA256)
Replay protection window 300 s

8 · Document signature

Algorithm SHA-256
Signed at 2026-05-17T15:54:56+00:00
Input canonical JSON of evidence pack with signatures + generated_at fields removed

43826cfee0d0c886a0365d15455e2c53f598df04298e0d234f178a04e635af68

Verify by re-issuing this evidence pack against the same period and comparing the digest above to the one returned by /v1/compliance/evidence/manifest.